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he causal wars are still raging,1 and the 
amount of collateral damage is increasing.2 
Are the benefits from this heated debate also 
increasing? Is the net balance over time positive 
or negative? It may be useful to attempt a 
summary of the major points of the present 
situation in this campaign, although it must be 
considered as coming from an “embedded” 
correspondent rather than a neutral observer. 
                                                
1 The causal wars are about what is to count as 
scientifically impeccable evidence of a causal connection, 
usually in the context of the evaluation of interventions 
into human affairs. The most recent battles are between 
those arguing that only the use of RCTs should be 
accepted as providing acceptable evidence (sometimes, 
the exotic regression discontinuity (RD) design is also 
allowed). The RCT or randomly controlled trial, is an 
experimental design involving at least two groups of 
subjects, the control group and the experimental group 
(a.k.a. study group, or treatment group), between which 
the subjects are distributed by a strictly random process 
(i.e., one with no exceptions), and which are not further 
identified or distinguished by any common factor besides 
the application of the experimental treatment to the 
experimental group. 
2 The collateral damage comes from the policy that the 
RCT camp has been supporting with considerable 
success, here referred to as “the exclusionary policy,” 
which recommends that no (or almost no) programs be 
funded whose claims of good effects cannot be supported 
by RCT-based evidence. This means terminating many 
demonstrably excellent programs currently saving huge 
numbers of life-years. It is argued here that the 
exclusionary policy is not only based on false premises 
about the merits of (alleged) RCT designs, but even if its 
premises were true, it does not follow from them. 
This is an evaluation of a methodology, and 
such evaluations, common in all methodological 
literature and in the philosophy of science, are 
part of a sub-division of the discipline of 
evaluation sometimes referred to as 
intradisciplinary evaluation. It is an essential 
component of any discipline, since it is what 
justifies the term “discipline”—a field of study 
that could not distinguish reliably and validly 
between good and bad research methods could 
not be identified as a science rather than a 
pseudo-science.3  
It should be noted in this introduction that 
the importance of the issue here lies not just in 
the key role of causation in evaluation, but also 
in the key role of causation in what might be 
called the middle ground of the body of 
investigative methods, those that lie between 
the highly theoretical and the highly localized 
techniques. This includes the key methods for 
many, perhaps most, practical investigations. It 
is not accidental that causation shares with 
evaluation the peculiar distinction of having 
been attacked as a concept that has no proper 
place in science. In each case, this was based on 
a superficial and elitist conception of science, 
the same elitist conception that argues for 
technology as an inferior discipline to—or as a 
mere spin-off from—“real science.” In all three 
cases, the truth of the matter is that the concept 
or practice under attack was a full-fledged and 
                                                
3 This is a putative one-sentence refutation of the concept 
of “value-free science.” 
T
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vital part of disciplined reflective and practical 
thought long before science began—in the case 
of technology, the seniority is provably by at 
least a million years—and continues in that role 
today. The attempt to promote RCT to a 
keystone role in the analysis of causation is, if 
the arguments below are sound, essentially one 
more of these examples of academic affectation, 
and those of a practical turn of mind should 
treat it with great caution. It is often suggested 
that the RCT campaign is a revival of the old 
quantitative vs. qualitative debate, but the 
suggestion here is that it goes deeper than that, 
although linked in one respect. Both are partly 
and perhaps unconsciously driven by the urge 
to create a new specialty, an esoteric cabal in 
which the originators have a privileged position 
as keeper of the keys to knowledge. That’s a 
common accompaniment of the creative urge, 
but it is a temptation with a downside—the risk 
that one creates unnecessary barriers for those 
seeking help, and new idols rather than new 
appreciation of true values. 
Along with the attempt to redefine the 
concepts of—or at least the acceptable ways to 
establish—evidence and causation, the RCT 
campaign also involves the less-remarked 
parallel effort, going back further, to redefine 
the concept of an experiment. In standard 
scientific usage, experiments are just carefully 
constrained explorations, and the RCT is simply 
a special case of these. To call the RCT the only 
“true experiment” is part of an attempt at 
redefinition that distorts the original and 
continuing usage, and excludes experiments 
designed to test many simple hypotheses 
about—or simple efforts to find out—what 
happens if we do this. 
This effort at persuasive redefinition is allied 
with an implicit denigration of the so-called 
“quasi-experimental” designs, which are in fact 
perfectly respectable experiments, only ‘quasi’ 
with respect to the one respect in which they 
have less control over one possible way of 
excluding one type of alternative explanation. 
But in other respects, equally important in the 
practical business of selecting appropriate 
designs to get definite answers in the given 
circumstances, they are often massively 
superior, e.g., with respect to the number of 
subjects required in order to achieve useful 
results; the extent to which they avoid intrusion 
into a natural course of events that it may be 
very important not to disturb; their cost, not 
just in money terms but in terms of other 
important values, etc. Of particular importance, 
the commonly accepted implication of the 
“quasi” terminology—that the conclusions from 
them will be less secure—is, as argued below, 
categorically false. It is based on an abstract 
concept of proof or certainty that ignores the 
practical process and standards used by working 
scientists and engineers—and by historians and 
judges in courts of law, and by everyone when 
acting as real people facing crucial decisions—
all of whose approaches are treated with more 
respect in the present paper.  
This review focuses on what might be called 
a reconsideration of the working credentials of 
the RCT design, and includes some radical new 
perspectives on these, with relatively brief 
coverage of the usual suspects. It presupposes 
reasonable familiarity with the concepts of 
experimental design. The key claim or claims in 





A. The RCT design is a theoretical construct of 
considerable interest, but it has essentially zero 
practical application to the field of human 
affairs. It is important to be clear that a 
true RCT study has to be (at least) 
double-blind, as are all sound 
pharmacological studies, whereas the 
applications in public health, education, 
social services, law enforcements, etc., 
that are currently advocated as RCTs are 
neither double-blind nor even single 
blind, but ‘zero-blind.’ Such studies are 
of course open to the unintended 
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explanation of their results by appeal to 
the Hawthorne effect or its converse, 
since it’s usually easy for members of 
the experimental and control groups to 
work out which one they are in. Hence 
the common argument that the RCT designs 
being advocated in areas like education, public 
health, international aid, law enforcement, etc., 
have the (unique) advantage of “eliminating all 
spurious explanations” is completely invalid. It 
was careless to suppose that 
randomization of subject allocation 
would compensate for the failure to 
blind the subjects (as in single blind 
studies), let alone the failure to blind the 
treatment dispensers, a.k.a. service 
providers (the requirement that 
distinguishes the double-blind study). 
The RCT banner in the applied human 
sciences is in fact being flown over 
pseudo-RCTs.4 This failing is not the 
result of carelessness, but of the almost 
complete impossibility, at least within 
the constraints of the usual protocols 
governing experimentation with human 
subjects, of arranging for even single 
blind conditions.5 
B. Even the best double-blind drug studies do not 
have the unique explanatory power claimed by 
the proponents of RCTs for their zero-blind 
studies. These studies, usually thought to 
be paradigm examples of RCT design, 
are themselves open to challenge as not 
meeting the requirements of RCT 
                                                
4 This would appear to be the correct term, but, to avoid 
arguments about terminology and in the interests of 
conciliation, we replace it with “quasi-RCT” in what 
follows. Note that if one did wish to claim that the zero-
blind design is terminologically entitled to be called a true 
RCT, then one must immediately abandon the claim that 
RCT designs eliminate spurious explanations.  
5 The word “almost” in this sentence should be noted, 
and suggests that rather more effort be devoted to 
identifying and using blinding. After all, it was too quickly 
assumed in the last decades of the 20th century, that 
randomization of subject allocation was rarely feasible in 
social experiments, and we have benefited from 
reconsideration of that assumption. 
design as that concept is normally 
understood. This has led to some 
demand for what are called “triple 
blind” studies. That term is variously 
defined,6 and has been used to refer to 
blinding (or excluding via the use of 
computer-controlled experiments) the 
statistician analyzing the results, or the 
pharmacist sometimes used to 
administer the drugs, or the radiologist 
or pathologist doing the first stage of 
interpreting the data.* (check Google or 
Wikipedia for updated references). Here 
I will use the term “fully-blind” to cover 
such cases and more, by defining it as a 
study in which no-one involved in 
providing, securing, or receiving the 
treatment, or analyzing the results, can 
identify the group membership of any 
subject until the final decoding step. (It 
is also desirable, though not here made 
into a definitional requirement, for that 
final step to be done under the 
supervision and control of a named and 
certifiably independent observer with 
the skills required to fully understand 
the complete process.)  
 
The need for fully-blind studies, over and 
above double-blind studies, arises from the fact 
that members of both groups receiving 
treatment in a double-blind experiment usually 
know that status to be the case, i.e., they know 
when they are receiving some kind of treatment, 
even if they don’t know whether it is the 
experimental treatment or a placebo. They 
frequently know this because they have been 
told it in order to meet local interpretations of 
constraints on the use of human subjects; but 
they may also be able to infer it from other 
                                                
6 With these ongoing discussions and some fugitive 
documents, the best references are those that are 
constantly updated, in this case Google and Wikipedia or 
the specialized and restricted medical or legal research 
databases. In this article an asterisk is used to indicate that 
the best references are there. 
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clues, e.g., variations from normal procedures. 
This means that differential benefits to the 
experimental group, if any emerge, may be due 
either to the experimental treatment, or to the 
sum of that effect plus the effect of any 
interaction of that treatment with the 
psychological impact of knowing that one is 
part of an experiment on a new drug. One 
cannot assume non-interaction here, of course, 
and only if that assumption were true could one 
infer that the differences between the two 
outcomes are due to the experimental treatment 
on its own.  
A simple example of a fully-blind study 
would be one where the subjects were long-
term ward patients in a hospital and the drug or 
placebo was a tasteless addition to their regular 
meals; or, if they were all on drip treatment, the 
placebo and experimental drug, pre-tested for 
being intravenously asymptomatic, were 
introduced by injection into the drip bag while 
the patients were asleep. They would then not 
know when or if they were receiving treatment. 
But note that if the drug was very successful its 
presence would be inferable in the experimental 
subjects (just as if it had serious side-effects), 
the blinding would be lost and the experiment 
would have to be curtailed. Ethics in the fully-
blind study might be addressed by asking for 
volunteers who might or might not be used in a 
study where these conditions would be 
employed. Since this involves a slight breach of 
full blinding, a more subtle approach would be 
desirable. 
It’s arguable that “RCT” is usually taken to 
mean a design that meets or is functionally 
equivalent to a fully-blind design. For this 
reason, it seems fair to conclude that the designs 
commonly described as RCTs in the human 
affairs domains are not just two but three design 
stages removed from true RCTs. In any case, 
however you choose to use the term “RCT,” 
the zero-blind designs supported by the RCT 
protagonists for use in the human services area 
are obviously incapable of eliminating all 
spurious explanations, and the idea that we 
should treat them as the only source of good 
scientific evidence for causal claims or sound 
evaluations of interventions is roughly the 
equivalent of restricting our national entries in 
the Olympic marathon to runners with one leg. 
 
C. The difficulty of divorcing the 
“intrinsic” effects of a treatment from 
the psychological effects of giving the 
treatment has two debilitating results for 
causal inferences from experimental 
designs. The first we have just 
covered—the problem that the 
distinctive effects seen in the 
experimental group are possibly due to 
the combined effects of two factors, not 
just to treatment effects. The second 
problem is that one cannot tell what the 
effect of the experimental treatment will 
be if administered outside the 
experimental context because you can’t 
tell how much that context is adding to 
the effects. Hence generalizing from even a 
true RCT to real world use of the experimental 
treatment tested in the RCT is hazardous, and 
any true RCT study has to be supplemented 
with extensive high quality field reports on real 
world use. This is one reason one can’t 
speed up drug testing without 
substantial risk, particularly because 
much of the normal process of 
gathering the real world test data is left 
in the already over-occupied hands of 
the general practitioner or specialist. 
What does this mean for research based 
on quasi-RCTs? 
 
Essentially, it adds a fourth ravine of 
disconnect between the quasi-RCT design and 
any justified practical use, and, most notably, 
since we do not have a huge cadre of trained 
scientists like the groups acting as field reporters 
in the medical field, it means that this fourth 
gap can only be filled in by seriously funded 
studies using expert field researchers who will 
of course not be using RCTs. But that fourth 
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gap is not mentioned or staffed in any of the 
large RCTs I have seen funded under the new 
exclusionary funding policy, and would face 
difficulties in getting funding under the current 
practices since it is not an RCT design.7  
So the irony of the present situation is that 
the value of quasi-RCTs, if it is substantial, 
cannot be established via the usual arguments 
for the superiority of the design; indeed, we 
now see that it cannot be established via a 
simple empirical demonstration without 
depending on non-RCT researchers. Since the 
RCT group, now in power in many domains, 
neither recognizes this nor is willing to support 
non-RCT research, it has cut itself off from its 
only remaining avenue to legitimacy. 
 
D. But there is more bad news ahead. The 
other logical advantage of the RCT 
design that is claimed by its protagonists 
is that it supports what is said to be the 
key logical property of causes, the fact 
that they support counterfactuals (i.e., a 
cause is something without which the 
effect would not have occurred). 
However, this counterfactual-supporting 
property is certainly not a logical property of 
causes, as stated, and even more certainly is not 
a logical property possessed by the quasi-RCTs 
being supported by RCT protagonists. It’s not 
a logical property of causes, as it stands, 
because of the common phenomenon 
of overdetermination, i.e., situations 
where an effect E is caused by event C, 
but E would have occurred even if C 
                                                
7 One frequently hears protests that there is no restriction 
of funding to RCTs. It’s true that there are some explicit 
references to the possibility of alternative approaches 
being funded in the official releases, but all the many 
reports that seem to have surfaced tell a different story of 
the actual practice in the review panels, in fact a story of 
huge funding for poorly trained RCT groups over really 
strong alternative approaches requesting small amounts 
of support. If anyone was interested in refuting these 
stories it would be easy enough to do so via a small meta-
study, but those controlling the funding have shown no 
interest in doing this. Power corrupts even scientists. 
had not occurred, because of 
circumstance ⎯C which is “lurking in the 
background,” ready to do the deed if C 
does not do so. For example, when an 
outfielder—let’s say his name is Jaime 
Cortez—makes an easy catch of a fly 
ball in a professional baseball game (a 
causal claim), the fact that a second 
outfielder got into position behind him 
and would have made the catch if 
Cortez had missed it, does not lead us to 
say Cortez did not in fact make the 
catch, although it is clear the 
counterfactual does not hold.8 
 
The counterfactual claim has caught on 
throughout a large slice of the social sciences 
and has a certain amount of appeal to the group 
of professionals and managers that is not literate 
in the specialized field of the logic of causation. 
The pitch goes like this: “You want to support 
interventions that really matter—in other words, 
ones about which you could say, if they hadn’t 
been done, then we would not have gotten 
these results—well, the RCT is the way to go, 
and it’s the only way to go.” Not true, not even 
of real RCTs, and not even half-true of quasi-
RCTs. Cause is an even more complex concept 
than counterfactual and it implies both more 
and less than the latter notion.9 
                                                
8 A common defense against such counter-examples is to 
say that E means ‘E at the time it did occur.’ But it’s easy 
enough to construct a case where ⎯C produces E at the 
same time that E does, and such cases have been well 
known in the literature on the logic of cause for more 
than forty years, although poorly understood in the social 
science discussions. For example, in Counterfactuals and 
Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research 
(Morgan & Winship, 2007), there are no references to 
overdetermination (or redundant causation, a related 
term), by contrast with the 25 in the excellent 
philosophical anthology Causation and Counterfactuals 
(Collins, Hall, & Paul, eds., 2004), or see my “Causes, 
Connections, and Conditions in History” (1966) in 
various anthologies.* (check Google or Wikipedia for 
updated references). 
9 No attempt is made here to give anything like a full 
analysis of causation, only of methods for identifying it. 
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E. The threats of confounding variables to RCT 
designs are extremely serious and numerous, 
and costly to handle, and require continual 
highly skilled attention that is often not 
budgeted or staffed in RCT studies. Now 
we’ll look at some better-known 
problems with RCTs, although we’ll 
bring out some aspects of these 
considerations that are less well 
understood. The aim is to show that the 
only feasible RCT-type designs usable in 
the human affairs fields are, like most of 
the alternatives, just one risky and tricky 
design to consider for causal 
investigations. We’ll begin with some of 
the more obvious difficulties.  
 
In the definition given earlier of an (ideal) 
RCT, we included the condition that the 
experimental and control groups be 
distinguished only by the experimental 
treatment of the former, since any other 
distinguishing factor would be a potential 
contaminant, a.k.a. spurious cause. There are 
some quite deep difficulties with real world 
attempts to meet this condition that we have 
not so far addressed. We need to stress the 
problem that getting volunteers of the required 
type for our studies will often mean that they 
are—increasingly, as experience now 
indicates—not typical of the group to which we 
wish to generalize. To this we add the fact that 
the need for two large groups disadvantages the 
RCT design from the start for both availability 
and cost reasons, keeping in mind that some 
excellent alternative designs require only one 
group, e.g., the interrupted time series design, 
and others can use smaller groups with 
                                                                           
Its complexity has led many analysts, e.g., Nancy 
Cartwright (2007) in Hunting Causes and Using Them: 
Approaches to Philosophy and Economics, to argue that “there 
is a great variety of different kinds of causes…” I think 
this may be taken to suggests that “cause” is ambiguous, 
which I think is not true; I have suggested as an 
alternative that the reason for the variety is that a cause is 
(roughly) any single-factor empirical explanation, and 
there are many different ways to explain something.  
comparable power, e.g., variants of case study 
approaches. 
Taking another example from the 
preliminary planning phase, we often want there 
to be a number of villages (or clinics or wards 
or classrooms) in each group, randomly 
allocated as to which group they are in. Now, 
any two such groups will always be 
distinguished by some factors, e.g., location, or 
they would not be different groups. And these 
unavoidable distinguishing factors may be 
linked in an unexpected way to causally relevant 
differentiating factors such as local variations in 
weather (if the average physical displacement is 
substantial), or (if it’s minor) room temperature, 
or ambient noise level, or facilities management 
style, which then invalidate the inference to the 
experimental treatment as being the only 
possible cause of any outcome differences. The 
standard ways of handling these problems in the 
design phase are via stratification and/or large 
numbers, since by using large enough groups, 
and/or forced sorting on at least the leading 
known potential causal variables, we hope to 
have enough entities in each group to constitute 
an equivalent range of location, management, 
etc., and hence to “balance these factors out” of 
the relevant calculations. But to attain high 
confidence levels in this way requires paying the 
price of large size, already mentioned. And, 
probably more importantly, to reduce the risk of 
complete failure, we still need to keep a 
continuing careful and highly trained eye on all 
groups to make sure no new factors turn out to 
be active that we have not stratified for, or that 
are not covered by our numbers. Call this first 
group of potentially contaminating factors—the 
first set of reminders that we are in the real 
world of experiments—the Delta Group. 
There is another group of such factors that 
are commonly recognized—e.g., by Tom Cook, 
who regards them as so serious as to constitute 
in themselves good reasons to abjure any use of 
the term “gold standard” for RCTs—which 
we’ll call the Epsilon Group. These factors can 
only surface during the course of running an RCT, 
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rather than from the beginning, as with the 
Delta Group. Two of them are sufficiently well-
known to excuse further exposition here: cross-
contamination, a.k.a. leakage (usually of the 
experimental treatment over to the control 
group, but the reverse is possible), and 
differential attrition (usually of the control 
group members), which can take us below the 
shared number of post-tests that we need for 
reasonable confidence in the results.  
The Delta and Epsilon confounders are 
especially serious threats in exactly the cases 
where RCTs are often thought to be best suited 
for application, i.e., in dealing with slow-acting, 
small-size effects. These factors have four 
important properties: they are potentially fatal 
flaws in an RCT, they have often ruined very 
expensive RCTs designed and run by very well-
trained researchers, their effects can virtually 
never be factored out ex post facto, and they 
require specially trained observers almost 
constantly watching for their emergence, 
continuing presence, and magnitude—observers 
who have to be empowered to act quickly to 
stem the swift hemorrhaging of validity.10 It is 
ironic that the skills and responsibilities required 
of such absolutely essential observers are most 
often to be found in the repertoire of a few 
qualitative researchers (although by no means 
the norm amongst them) and are often ignored 
or absent or inadequately provided for in the 
payroll of many of the quantitative researchers 
that are normally funded to do RCTs. In any 
case, the Delta/Epsilon factors raise the cost, 
entry, and maintenance requirements for the 
real-world quasi-RCTs very high. This makes 
that approach hard to justify except in special 
circumstances where, like half a dozen other 
designs in their special circumstances, they are a 
better choice than their real-world alternatives. 
 
                                                
10 These observers must be both present regularly and 
able to act quickly, because even if spotted immediately, 
these factors have to be controlled very quickly in order 
to save the experiment. 
F. The discussion of the previous sections 
appears to show that: (i) the frequently 
claimed logical credentials of RCTs do 
not support the real world quasi-RCTs 
championed by the RCT camp; and 
that: (ii) those real world designs have 
their own particular and serious 
limitations. But they do retain the 
random allocation procedure. So we still 
need to inquire whether this leaves them 
with some residual general superiority. 
Or does the existence of the four 
divides listed earlier—the gaps between 
them and the ideal RCT—leave them 
without any special ability to exclude 
any other cause besides the experimental 
treatment? Basically, the answer is both 
yes—in one sense (of “special”)—and 
no, in another sense; and the two senses 
cancel each other out, leaving the quasi-
RCT with no net advantage. 
 
The arguments of D show that the quasi-
RCT design must include provision for 
protection against many factors that have to be 
actively prevented from becoming alternative 
causes, in both the design phase and in the 
monitoring (and intervention) phase. This is 
exactly the same situation, from one point of 
view, as the situation when using any quasi-
experimental design—although of course the 
particular threats vary from design to design. 
The randomization is still a special virtue in that 
it does break some causal chains from spurious 
causes, but its four removes from the fully-blind 
design mean that randomization does not 
remove a large family of significant spurious 
causes from consideration.11 Now many other 
                                                
11 For readers who are dubious about the claim that 
Hawthorne-type effects are significant threats, it may be 
worth recalling the interesting experiment done in the 
early days of placebo studies, that showed the placebo 
effect works just fine even if the control group is told they 
are getting the placebo, and are instructed and tested on 
their knowledge of exactly what this means. (The exact 
reference for this study is now hard to trace,* (check 
Google or Wikipedia for updated references) but in the 
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designs have analogous “special strengths” 
corresponding to the remaining virtues of the 
quasi-RCT, with no more than its share of 
weaknesses. For example, in the interrupted 
times series (ITS) design, the use of individual 
subjects as their own controls is a notable and 
powerful feature. It avoids some of the spurious 
causes that are still serious threats in the quasi-
RCT design, such as those to which it is 
vulnerable because of differential attrition and 
imperfect matching, or those emerging 
environmental factors that differentially affect 
the control group because of, for example, its 
different location. And it greatly reduces the 
required sample size. The ITS strengths are thus 
special in their own way, i.e., superior, to almost 
all other designs in these respects, just as 
randomization is still a special strength of the 
RCT design. On the other hand, ITS is subject 
to the grave limitation that it will only work 
with ephemeral effects, due to threat from the 
spurious explanations of learning and 
habituation. The bottom line is that when we total up 
the strengths and weaknesses of any of the half-dozen 
leading designs we get the same situation, namely each 
has substantial entries in both columns: there is no clear 
edge for quasi-RCTs that holds across all cases. So, 
although the real-world RCT still has its own unique 
strength, that strength is no stronger than the strengths of 
the good alternatives like the IST, on their own home 
ground. Now that is not an obituary of the quasi-
RCT, but it should be an obituary of its public 
persona, as recently represented.  
However, a good evaluation, summative or 
formative, does not restrict itself to looking at 
the limitations of the evaluand (the entity being 
evaluated), and we will now go on to consider 
several alternative entries in the race meeting at 
which we award the Gold Standard Cups. These 
include a gold standard—actually a higher 
standard than a gold standard, perhaps a 
platinum standard—for causal claims; a gold 
standard for causal experimental designs; one for 
funding evaluations (and other research involving 
                                                                           
mid-20th century it was widely accepted as reputable, and 
I have not been able to find a refutation.) 
causal claims); one for funding programs; and, 
along the way, one for good evidence. If these 
awards are well-justified, we will then have 
outlined a fairly complete alternative system for 
thinking about evidence and causation; and 
perhaps then we can say, “The king is dead, 
long live the king.” Let’s start with the most 
shocking of the alternatives. 
 
G. The real “gold standard” for causal claims is 
the same ultimate standard as for all scientific 
claims; it is critical observation. Causation 
can be directly observed, in lab or home 
or field, usually as one of many 
contextually embedded observations, 
such as lead being melted by heating a 
crucible, eggs being fried in a pan, or a 
hawk taking a pigeon. And causation 
can also be inferred from non-causal 
direct observations with no 
experimentation, as by the forensic 
pathologist performing an autopsy to 
determine the cause of death. 
  
A lingering effect of an antique 
epistemology is the still common belief amongst 
scientists that the examples just given of the 
direct observation of causation are “really” cases 
of inference to a causal conclusion. This item of 
philosophical mythology goes back to Hume 
and earlier, though it is thought to be further 
reinforced by recent neurophysiology. But this 
is a confusion of brain activity with thought 
processes; the latter depend on the former but 
are not identical to them. The infant’s brain 
develops visual concepts—and probably 
inherits some as well—and in that learning 
process often infers to their presence, but the 
adult sees the world through those concepts, not 
by recapitulating the inferential process.  
Thus the adult sees his friend Pierre, the 
person he has come to meet, in the crowd 
coming off the plane at the airport; he does not 
see a string of shapes, compare each with the 
stored templates in his memory, and hence infer 
that his friend is in front of him. In the same 
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way, while as an infant it may make sense to say 
that he had to infer that he has knocked a cup 
off the table onto the floor, it is correct to say 
that as an adult, he sees that his infant son has 
just done that. This is seeing C cause E, seeing 
causation, not inferring it. No doubt the 
extended brain is still doing quite a bit of 
processing, probably some of it farmed out to 
the optic nerve, but the mind is not; its survival 
skills have taught it when to go into shortcut 
mode, and it has long since reduced what used 
to be an inference to a perception. 
Similarly, the adult is called on in court to 
bear witness to what he saw, including bearing 
witness to having seen the defendant strike the 
victim several times, a causal claim. The courts 
speak carefully about the difference between 
what can be seen and what is inferred, pushing 
hard for the assumptions involved in the latter 
case, and rightly allow that perception can 
include the direct, non-inferential, perception of 
causation. Matters of life and death hinge on the 
court’s critical appraisal of what can and cannot 
be determined by observation, and that is surely 
as high a standard as any that we need for 
scientific evidence. What is true for visual 
perception is no less true for the best examples 
of other modes of sensory perception: for 
example, experienced drivers are all rightly 
certain that on many occasions they have 
slowed their car or cycle by applying the brakes 
to it. The whole of science rests on the ultimate 
testability of critically appraised observational 
claims, so I conclude that since these can 
include causal claims, we can be sure that we 
have attained the gold standard for them. Since 
critically appraised observation provides the 
best evidence for, and indeed the best kind of 
causal claims, it is time to examine the 
implications of this position for experimental 
design. 
 
H. The first implication is that the 
professionally performed case study, since it is 
often suffused with causal claims based on 
observation, is immediately reinstated as a live 
candidate for respectable demonstration of 
causation. Let us be clear here, as in 
subsequent discussion, that we are 
referring only to the best examples of 
this genre. In the past a great deal of 
hopelessly unscientific work has been 
put forward as “qualitative methodol-
ogy,” including many anecdotal reports 
described as case studies, and it is not 
being reinstated by the present 
assertion. We are simply going to avoid 
guilt by association, and allow that there 
are case studies in the critical tradition 
of good scientific work, where what is 
reported, and checked, includes causal 
claims. They will be found in most 
cultural anthropology, in biological and 
sociological field work, in epidemiology, 
planetology, cosmogony, and geology, in 
many engineering studies of structural 
or machine failure, in the best clinical 
psychology and medicine, and very 
often outside science in the best 
disciplinary traditions of history and the 
law.  
 
Someone may protest that case studies are 
aimed to establish singular facts, not the general 
propositions that science is concerned to 
establish. But that view of science is simply 
another myth: much of science—for example, a 
large part of the divisions of science listed 
above—is mainly concerned to establish 
singular facts. Even if that were not so, what is 
definitely so is that most of program evaluation, 
and most other branches of evaluation such as 
personnel evaluation, is primarily concerned to 
establish singular facts, namely the merit, worth, 
and/or significance (m/w/s) of a particular 
program. Even if, contrary to fact, that were not 
the business of science, then all that would 
follow would be that evaluation is not a science, 
but is rather a discipline like history or the law, 
also primarily concerned with the particular—
with what are called idiographic phenomena 
rather than nomothetic ones—and it would be 
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none the less respectable for that. So the 
restriction of case studies to the particular is not 
a drawback for much of evaluation.  
Case study research is not restricted to 
single cases, as Yin (2002) demonstrates. In fact, 
it has been usefully extended in what Robert 
Brinkerhoff calls “The Success Case Method” in 
his book by the same title (2003).  
Now, case study approaches do become 
expensive when dealing with large studies, a 
drawback that has to be weighed against their 
great advantages in turning up fine details that 
lead to the next stage of research, something 
not so common when dealing with large 
numbers of cases on each of which very limited 
data is gathered. But this does not mean that we 
need RCTs for big general studies or for studies 
that depend on statistical analysis for their 
conclusions. There are many alternatives, 
ranging from the simpler ‘quasi-experimental’ 
designs to the vast net of studies that 
conclusively identified smoking as a major cause 
of lung cancer in humans without including a 
single RCT with human subjects. So RCTs, to 
use that term loosely—and certainly quasi-
RCTs—have no categorical advantage for either 
large or small investigations. 
 
I. The key point for the present stage in this 
discussion is that the suggestion that we need 
RCTs to establish causation in evaluation is as 
far-fetched as the suggestion that we need them 
to establish all causal claims in history, such as 
the claim that the Iraq war caused the death of 
many US citizens; or in order to establish the 
guilt of every defendant accused of speeding (i.e., 
causing a car to break the speed limit) or of 
causing grievous bodily harm, i.e., assault. 
Almost all of the causal claims made in 
the real world that are beyond 
reasonable doubt are based on 
observation or direct inference from 
observation, whether in the context of 
scientific lab, clinic, or field work, or in 
the practice of the law or history, or 
everyday affairs or journalism; and these 
can be assembled and analyzed 
statistically with either the microscope 
of case study approaches or the lighter 
touch of large studies. 
 
Once again, we see how important it is to 
keep a firm grip on our common sense in the 
heat of the current dispute about the role of 
RCTs in establishing causation. The suggestion 
that they are needed to support the evaluation 
of international aid programs, for example, is 
about as sensible as the suggestion that we 
should not believe any claims about deaths due 
to the wars in Darfur or in Iraq unless we have 
RCT-based evidence. It is no harder to establish 
that a program that gives food or shelter to 
those who need it immediately has beneficial 
consequences than it is to establish that the 
enemy’s mortar shells killed fifty soldiers this 
week.  
 
J. Of course, there are programs, in 
international aid and elsewhere, for 
which it’s not so easy to establish that 
they are producing benefits, or just how 
large those benefits are. As previously 
mentioned, these are likely to be 
programs where the effects are smaller, 
less immediate, and less obvious, 
especially programs where the net 
effects are simply not observable in each 
single case. For some but not all of 
these, an RCT design may be 
appropriate. For others—probably the 
majority but no-one has done the 
counting—we do better with other 
designs. It is now time to ask if there is 
some underlying methodology that can 
be used, or that logically underpins, all 
legitimate causal claims, since it clearly is 
not the RCT design. It will not only 
guide us in choosing more specific 
designs, but will serve us in many cases 
where no more specific design is needed 
and those where none of them work. 
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All approaches to substantiating causal claims, 
RCTs and case studies included, do indeed share the 
same basic logic, an underlying logic of all causal claims. 
To make it terminologically secure that we have 
something here that trumps the alleged gold 
standard, we use a name for it whose acronym 
supports that conclusion. It is the General 
Elimination Methodology or GEM approach, 
and its origin lies in the skills of every expert 
practice. General Elimination Methodology is 
the basis for all causal claims, and the best 
approach to use when direct observation, 
critically appraised, is not enough. In fact, it is 
the meta-program for the neural mechanism 
underlying the observation of causal 
connections, and it is the underlying logic of 
RCTs and all quasi-experimental approaches as 
well. 
It is based on one general premise and, 
unsurprisingly, two premises summarising 
practical knowledge, that being the home 
domain of causation and well below the usual 
level of scientific theories. In outline, it looks 
like this: 
 
i. The general premise is the deterministic 
principle: all macro events (or 
conditions, etc.) have a cause. This is 
only false at the micro-level, where the 
uncertainty principle applies, but the 
latter principle has essentially no 
detectable effect on the truth of macro-
determinism (though it is easy enough 
to deliberately create bizarre experi-
ments where it does). 
ii. The first ‘premise from practice’ is the 
list of possible causes (LOPC) of events 
of the type in which we are interested, 
e.g., learning gains, reduction of poverty, 
extension of life for AIDS patients. We 
have used LOPCs for more than a 
million years, in tracking and cooking 
and healing and repairing, and today 
every detective knows the list for 
murder just as every competent 
mechanic knows the list for a big-end 
rattle or a brake failure, though the 
knowledge is as often tacit as explicit, 
outside the classroom and the 
maintenance videos. An LOPC usually 
refers to causes at a certain temporal or 
spatial remove from the effect, and at a 
certain level of conceptualization, and 
will vary depending on these 
parameters; of course, the context of the 
investigation determines the appropriate 
distance parameters. The distant LOPC 
for murder is the list of possible 
motives; a more proximate one, 
developed in a particular case by 
applying the general one, is the list of 
suspects. When dealing with new 
effects, we may not be certain the list is 
complete, but we work with the list we 
have and extend it when necessary. 
iii. The second practical premise is the list 
of the modus operandi for each of the 
possible causes (the MOL). Each cause 
has a set of footprints, a short one if it’s 
a proximate cause, a long one if it’s a 
remote cause, but in general the MO is a 
sequence of intermediate or concurrent 
events or a set of conditions, or a chain 
of events, that has to be present when 
the cause is effective. There’s often a 
rubric for this; for example, in criminal 
(and most other) investigations into 
human agency, we use the rubric of 
means/motives/opportunity to get 
from the motives to the list of 
“suspects.” The MOL is the magnifying 
lens that fleshes out the candidate 
causes from the LOPC so that we can 
start fitting them to the case or rejecting 
them, for which we use the next 
premise. 
iv. The fourth premise comprises the “facts 
of the case,” and these are now 
assembled selectively, by looking for the 
presence or absence of factors listed in 
the MOs of each of the LOPCs. Only 
those causes are (eventually) left 
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standing whose MOs are completely 
present. Ideally, there will be just one of 
these, but sometimes more than one, 
which are then co-causes. (Note that 
there is no reference to counterfactuals.) 
 
Note also that the GEM works equally well 
with the determination of general or particular 
causal claims, i.e., with both causes of classes of 
effects (or with the effects in a large class of 
subjects), or with the causes of a particular 
effect on one occasion, or with one subject. So 
the GEM competes directly with the general 
methodology that is facilitated by the use of an 
experimental design such as RCT or IST, which 
is often unnecessary, and frequently impossible. 
For example, in determining the cause of a 
geological formation such as the Rocky 
Mountains, we are not in a position, for 
practical reasons, to do an RCT; in other cases, 
such as in evaluating most international aid, we 
could do it, but it would be unethical to do so. 
In both these types of case, the GEM works 
straightforwardly.  
To take an example from work in which I 
have been involved, when looking at the effect 
of aid given by Heifer or Gates to extremely 
poor farmers in East Africa, after determining 
that a substantial improvement in welfare has 
followed the arrival of aid, and has been 
sustained for a few years, we check for the 
presence of more than a dozen other possible 
causes of this observed subsequent increase in 
welfare, including: efforts by the country’s 
government that have actually trickled down to 
the village level, analogous efforts by other 
philanthropies, self-help gains resulting from 
inspired leadership in the local communities, 
increased income from family members 
traveling to well-paid job openings elsewhere 
and remitting money back home, increased 
prices for milk or calves in the local markets, 
the beneficial results of a few years of good 
weather or of improved water supply, or of 
technology-driven improvements in the quality 
of available commercial feed, veterinary meds or 
services, or grass seed for improving pastures. 
This requires considerable systematic effort, but 
no sophisticated experimental design, no 
sophisticated statistics or risk analysis. The 
GEM approach here is essentially an extension 
of common sense. Michael Quinn Patton (2008) 
provides another excellent example of the use 
of non-RCT methods in establishing causation 
in his article in this issue of JMDE. 
In the more complicated case of 
establishing that heavy smoking is a common 
cause of lung cancer, there were no RCTs 
involved—because of the ethical constraints—
but the scientific process of GEM proceeded 
without any resulting problem with our 
confidence in the finding. If we can reach the 
high level of confidence we have about smoking 
as a cause of cancer without placing any weight 
on an RCT, it is clear we have no need to 
believe that the absence of RCT evidence 
weakens the case for conclusions about 
causation—provided that the GEM approach is 
rigorously applied. And remember all the 
examples from geology, epidemiology, etc., 
where we also do not use RCT. Roughly 
speaking, there are about nine or ten ways to go 
about establishing causation beyond reasonable 
doubt, all of them relying on GEM for 
underpinning, and only one of them involving 
even a pale shadow of RCT. They are: (i) direct 
critical observation, e.g., visual, affective, tactile; 
(ii) reported (and validated) observation, e.g., 
case studies; (iii) direct or simple inductive 
inference from (i) or (ii), e.g., to the effects of 
meteorites on the far side of the moon’s 
surface, prior to satellite launching, or the 
famous inference to the effect of gravity on 
light rays from the observations of the 1919 
eclipse; (iv) simple GEM inference, e.g., 
autopsy, engineering breakdown, the 
international aid examples; (v) theoretical 
inference, based on use of an analogy or theory, 
e.g., geology, cosmogony; (vi) direct 
manipulation e.g., in the kitchen and lab; (vii) 
“natural experiments,” e.g., meteorology, 
epidemiology; (viii) ‘quasi-experimentation,’ e.g., 
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pre/post with comparison group in pedagogy, 
addiction studies, international aid; and (ix) 
quasi-RCTs, e.g., pharmacology. The tenth 
candidate is inference from cross-sectional data, 
and it needs a little more analysis than we have 
space for here. 
In sum, there is absolutely nothing 
imperative, and nothing in general superior, 
about the need for RCT designs, let alone the 
weak cousin of them that is all we are being 
offered in the areas currently being invaded by 
the demand that nothing less be accepted.  
 
K. A last nail in the coffin of the RCT 
cause, in the causal wars, comes from a 
check on authenticity. The ultimate test 
of authenticity is self-application when 
relevant. For example, it is often 
relevant for evaluators to have their own 
work evaluated, and a test of their 
authenticity is to see how often they do 
this, and ensure that it is done with the 
care that they call for in their own calls 
on others to have their programs 
evaluated. Now, if the RCT cause is 
legitimate, would it not be good practice 
for those now enforcing the 
exclusionary implementation of it to 
check whether their policy is working? 
In other words, to evaluate their own 
policy. If they do not do this, may one 
not conclude that they are failing a 
crucial test of their own doctrine?  
 
There is so far no sign of any such study, 
and that suggests two further conclusions. First, 
it is about time that one of the supervisory 
agencies—the General Accountability Office, or 
one of the Inspector-Generals’ offices—
checked out this situation, in which hundreds of 
millions of tax dollars are being invested.  
Second, and perhaps more significantly, one 
cannot refrain from speculating about the 
research design that would be appropriate for 
such a study. It seems clear that one could 
hardly do it by using an RCT design, not only 
because of circularity, but since that would 
involve withholding funding from half of a 
group of equally deserving applicants for a 
period of up to several years, a prima facie 
unethical action.12 This does prove that the RCT 
model cannot be universally ideal for 
investigating causal claims, and a moment’s 
thought will suggest that there will be many 
other programs of a similar kind—that is, tests 
of approaches to the investigation of causal 
claims—that also could not be investigated 
using RCT, for the same reason. In other 
words, the claim that the RCT is a fundamental 
necessity for causal investigations is self-
refuting: it not only cannot be applied to itself, 
but the exercise of contemplating doing that 
uncovers at least one family of important 
studies it cannot cope with. So the RCT empire-
builders do not meet their own standards. 
With all of the preceding discussion in 
mind, it is time to spell out what can reasonably 
be required in a funding policy aimed to 
upgrade the standards of evidence for causal 
claims, especially those on which evaluations 
often depend. We have covered the arguments 
on this thoroughly enough to suggest an 
appropriate type of policy; it only remains to 
formulate it. While there are good reasons for 
upgrading the standards of quality in causal 
research in the human services areas, there is 
absolutely no basis in logic or experience for 
doing this by restricting the funding of 
proposals or programs or research 
investigations to those using any one model for 
doing such investigations. The optimal procedure is 
simply to require very high standards in matching designs 
from the wide range that can yield high confidence levels, 
to the problem and the resources available. 
 
L. In conclusion, let me stress my full 
understanding that the point of view 
                                                
12 Unethical not just because it would be unfair to the 
applicants, but because it would deprive the equally 
deserving subjects of those applicants from the benefits 
of evaluation of and hence possibly support for the 
programs which are serving them. 
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presented here refers to a complex and 
difficult issue, and its arguments are 
almost certainly just as guilty of 
oversimplification as are, it claims, the 
distinguished scholars that are its target. 
It may indeed contain more serious 
errors than their position. It has been 
circulated prior to publication in the 
hope that these will be pointed out so 
that the paper can be corrected or, if 
appropriate, withdrawn; and, now that it 
is eventually published, it is in the hope 
that its remaining errors will be widely 
used as lessons learned for discussions 
that follow. This issue is not a mere 
academic dispute, and should be treated 
as one involving the welfare of very 
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